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This paper intervenes in orthodox under-standings of Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
colonial history to elucidate another history 
that is not widely recognised. This is a 
financial history of colonisation which, while 
implicit in existing accounts, is peripheral and 
often incidental to the central narrative. 
Undertaking to reread Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
early colonial history from 1839 to 1850, this 
paper seeks to render finance, financial 
instruments, and financial institutions explicit 
in their capacity as central agents of colonisation. 
In doing so, it offers a response to the relative 
inattention paid to finance as compared with 
the state in material practices of colonisation. 
The counter-history that this paper begins to 
elicit contains important lessons for counter-
futures. For, beyond its implications for 
knowledge, the persistent and violent role of 
finance in the colonisation of Aotearoa has 
concrete implications for decolonial and anti-
capitalist politics today. 
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This paper intervenes in orthodox understandings of 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s colonial history to elucidate another 
history that is not widely recognised.1 This is a financial 
history of colonisation which, while implicit in orthodox 
accounts, is peripheral to, and often treated as incidental in, 
the central narrative. Finance and considerations of economy 
more broadly often have an assumed status in historical 
narratives of this country’s colonisation. In these, finance is 
a necessary condition for the colonial project that seems to 
need no detailed inquiry. While financial mechanisms such 
as debt, taxes, stocks, bonds, and interest are acknowledged 
to be instrumental to the pursuit of colonial aims, they are, 
in themselves, viewed as neutral. ‘Finance’ therefore tends 
to name a passive technical apparatus operating in the 
background of historical narratives of Aotearoa’s colonisation, 
while the actions and motives of states and individuals are 
accorded centrality as key drivers of colonisation and provide 
the anchoring points of colonial histories. 
Undertaking to reread the early colonial history of 
1 I would like to thank Campbell Jones for his invaluable support 
and critical insight while I was writing my MA thesis, from which this 
paper has sprung. I would also like to acknowledge my whakapapa 
and, in particular, my grandfather, John Cumming, who wrote his 
own financial history of colonisation in 1963. I offer my paper as a 
critical inverse of his.
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New Zealand from 1839 to 1850, this paper seeks to render financial 
institutions, instruments, and practices explicit in their capacity as central 
agents of colonisation. In doing so, it offers a response to the relative 
inattention paid to finance as compared with the state in material practices 
of colonisation. This inattention, as will be seen, reflects and reinforces 
a tendency to ascribe finance neutrality, as a sphere of activity abstracted 
from politics and history. Against this, this paper brings to light a counter-
history of early colonial New Zealand in which financial institutions, 
instruments, and practices not only aided but actively implemented mass 
colonial emigration to Aotearoa and an immense appropriation of Māori 
lands and resources.
The counter-history presented in this paper centres upon the actions 
of the New Zealand Company, the private enterprise which implemented 
the organised settler-colonisation of Aotearoa. It spans just over a decade, 
bookended by the formation of the company in 1839 and its dissolution 
in 1850, two events which are shown to be equally marked by and 
expressive of a deep historical and material intertwinement between finance 
and colonisation that has significantly shaped the social and political 
development of modern Aotearoa New Zealand. The paper is organised 
into four sections, the first three of which loosely correspond to three key 
phases of the New Zealand Company’s operation. Each of these sections 
highlights a particular financial instrument or practice that was central to 
colonisation: the joint-stock system, speculation, and the public bailout. 
The history elucidated in this paper runs counter to that which is normally 
told. It presents a challenge to orthodox understandings of the colonisation 
of Aotearoa and, in particular, the centrality accorded to the state as the 
architect of the colonial project. As will be argued, this challenge not only 
confronts established terrains of knowledge but has important implications 
for contemporary politics. In particular, the counter-history that this paper 
begins to elicit contains crucial lessons for the thinking of counter-futures 
beyond capitalism and colonialism. This claim is elaborated in the fourth 
section, where I discuss some of the challenges confronting movements to 
decolonise contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand when finance continues to 
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actively colonise Māori lands, resources, and value systems, and constrains 
the ideological and material boundaries within which ‘postcolonial’ politics 
play out. I will argue that situating contemporary intersections of finance 
capital and colonialism in the context of material histories is key to their 
respective unravelling and overcoming. 
The colonisation of Aotearoa: A capitalist collaboration
The colonisation of Aotearoa was initiated by a British joint-stock company 
formed in London in 1838. This was the New Zealand Company, a 
venture with several MPs on its board of directors and spearheaded by 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield: politician, convict, and ardent advocate of the 
colonisation of the country known as New Zealand. 
The formation of the company in August 1838 was the culmination 
of Wakefield’s tenacious but ultimately fruitless campaign to secure 
parliamentary support for his colonial venture during the 1837 session. 
Wakefield and many of the company’s other founding members were 
formerly engaged in the New Zealand Association, which spent much of 
1837 drafting a bill for the colonisation of Aotearoa and petitioning the 
House of Commons to adopt it. The bill provided for certain ‘Founders of 
Settlements’ to obtain land in Aotearoa and to negotiate with the ‘natives’ 
‘for a cession of all sovereign rights to Her Majesty’.2 It further empowered 
the Founders to enact laws and form a colonial militia. 
The association’s bill was opposed by the Colonial Office on the 
grounds that, ‘It proposes the acquisition of a sovereignty in New Zealand 
which would infallibly issue in the conquest and extermination of the 
2 ‘Abstract of a Bill Sent to Lord Howick, on the Part of the New Zealand 
Association, in June 1837’ (Appendix no. 18), in Report from the Select Committee 
of the House of Commons on New Zealand; Together with the Minutes of Evidence, 
Appendix, and Index, House of Lords Papers vol. 25, no. 303 (London: House of 
Lords, 1840), 163. 
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present inhabitants’.3 By 1839, Aotearoa had between 1,800–2,000 Pākehā 
inhabitants, comprised largely of whalers, sealers, traders, and missionaries, 
and concentrated in the north.4 Emigration had occurred in only an 
informal, unorganised manner, and the ‘sovereignty’ of the tribes of Aotearoa 
was ‘solemnly recognised’ by the Colonial Office and Church Missionary 
Society.5 This view must be understood in the context of the slavery-
abolition movement, as well as the 1837 report of the Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Aborigines, which raised public awareness of the atrocities 
suffered by Indigenous peoples in the name of British colonialism.6
In June 1838, the bill was defeated in its second reading by 92 votes to 
32, with one member calling it ‘the most monstrous proposal I ever knew 
made to the House’.7 This was a clear signal to the New Zealand Association 
that parliament was not prepared to back its proposed colonial endeavour. 
However, rather than dissuade Wakefield and his associates, this rejection 
only drove them to seek alternative means of raising the capital necessary 
to launch their project. The joint-stock system provided this means and, on 
29 August 1838, the New Zealand Company was formed.
In lieu of parliamentary support, finance was the precondition for the 
New Zealand Association’s project in Aotearoa. To convey the particular 
significance of finance for the New Zealand Association in 1838, it will be 
useful to briefly clarify what exactly is meant here by ‘finance’ and what its 
place is with respect to the capitalist economy in general. Finance refers to 
3 James Stephen, under-secretary of the Colonial Office, cited in Patricia Burns, 
Fatal Success: A History of the New Zealand Company, ed. Henry Richardson 
(Auckland: Heinemann Reed, 1989), 44–45. 
4 Peter Adams, Fatal Necessity: British Intervention in New Zealand, 1830–1847 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2013).
5 See Marquess Normanby to Captain Hobson, 14 August 1839, in Historical 
Records of New Zealand, volume I, ed. Robert McNab (Wellington: John Mackey, 
1908), 729–739.
6 See Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aboriginal Tribes, (British 
Settlements), Reprinted, with Comments, by the ‘Aborigines Protection Society’ (London: 
William Ball, 1837), available at http://apo.org.au/system/files/61306/apo-
nid61306-14546.pdf 
7 Lord Howick cited in Burns, Fatal Success, 64. 
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a distinct field of capitalist economic activity wherein profits are accrued 
through financial channels of accumulation such as trading in shares, stocks, 
and bonds (and, today, an array of complex securities and derivatives). 
Financial activity, Greta Krippner explains, ‘references the provision (or 
transfer) of capital in the expectation of future interest, dividends, or capital 
gains’.8 This is distinct but not detached from the accrual of profits though 
channels of commodity production and exchange. Finance is grounded in 
and, in many ways, reflects, elaborates, and intensifies aspects of the ‘real’ 
economy, at the same time as it is ‘a relatively autonomous field of capitalist 
profitmaking with its own rules and internal life’.9
In 1838, the specific amenability of finance to and utility for the New 
Zealand Association’s colonial project lay in its capacity to socialise wealth and, 
therefore, capitalist enterprise. The claim that finance effects a ‘socialisation’ 
of wealth derives from Marx’s analysis of banking, credit, and the joint-stock 
system. With the ascendancy of finance in Britain from the late 18th century, 
the private sums of wealth ‘scattered’ across the nation became centralised in 
the banks.10 This had the effect of creating a ‘social capital’, an immense pool 
of money to which access may be granted in the form of loans, and presided 
over by the banking class.11 This, Marx clarifies, is not a true socialisation 
of wealth, but rather ‘the abolition of capital as private property within 
the confines of the capitalist mode of production itself ’.12 With the rise of 
finance, capital emerges ‘as the common capital of the class’.13
8 Greta Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 4.
9 Costas Lapavitsas, ‘The Financialization of Capitalism: “Profiting Without 
Producing,”’ City 17, no.6 (2013): 799. 
10 Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, volume I, trans. Ben Fowkes 
(London: Penguin Classics, 1990), 778. Also see, Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political 
Economy, volume III, trans. David Fernbach (London: Penguin Classics, 1991), 
525–542. For a history of the spread of country banking in Britain and its role in 
industrialisation, see L. S. Pressnell, Country Banking in the Industrial Revolution 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1956).
11 Marx, Capital vol. III, 566–573.
12 Marx, Capital vol. III, 567.
13 Marx, Capital vol. III, 490.
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The joint-stock mode of capitalist organisation embodies and elaborates 
the ‘socialising’ powers of finance. With it, Marx explains, capital ‘now 
receives the form of social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) 
in contrast to private capital, and its enterprises appear as social enterprises 
as opposed to private ones’.14 By partitioning out the costs of capitalist 
enterprise, the joint-stock system enables capitalists to collaborate as a class 
to pursue ventures that would be unfeasible on the basis of a single capital. 
Such ventures include large-scale or long-term investments and those 
entailing a high degree of risk. Alongside railways and telecommunications, 
the joint-stock system was, then, particularly suited to and enabling 
of colonial endeavours. The creation of the joint-stock system from the 
16th century and the expansion of British imperialism were therefore 
inseparable and mutually enabling developments.15 As historian William 
Robert Scott writes, ‘the joint-stock company was the organization which, 
at each successive step, provided the requisites for the obtaining [of ] both 
sea-power and colonial possessions’.16
In 1838, it was precisely the socialising powers of the joint-stock 
company that made it the logical mode of organisation for the New Zealand 
Association’s colonial project. Wakefield and his associates turned to the 
joint-stock system as a means of circumventing the state and the barrier it 
posed to their scheme. As an incorporated company, they could issue shares 
to raise capital and independently implement the settler-colonisation of 
Aotearoa. In this, I want to emphasise that the New Zealand Company 
was not exceptional; it was but one particular expression of the liberating 
effects of finance for capitalist enterprise. Finance freed Wakefield and his 
associates from dependency on the British government just as it frees the 
limits of capitalist accumulation more generally by removing temporal and 
spatial barriers to the association of capitals. 
14 Marx, Capital vol. III, 567.
15 For a detailed history of the rise of the joint-stock system in connection with 
British-imperialist expansion, see William Robert Scott, The Constitution and Finance 
of English, Scottish and Irish Joint-Stock Companies to 1720 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1912). 
16 Scott, Constitution and Finance, 440.  
47
Thanks to the socialising powers of finance, then, material support 
for the colonisation of Aotearoa came not (initially) from the British 
government, but from the British capitalist class. On the basis of the 
joint-stock system, the New Zealand Association was able to partition out 
the costs of its proposed colonial endeavour across numerous individual 
investors. This granted the association access to a much larger pool of capital 
than that possessed by its immediate members, at the same time dispersing 
the risk of their venture across a broader social base. The colonisation of 
Aotearoa was, in the first instance, a capitalist collaboration.  
At its first gathering on 29 August 1838, the New Zealand Company 
moved quickly to elect a committee of subscribers and print a prospectus. 
Its stated purpose was to employ ‘capital in the purchase and resale of lands 
in New Zealand, and the promotion of emigration to that country’.17 The 
paid-up capital would be £25,000 in 50 shares of £500, with the potential 
to extend this to £500,000.18 The shares sold slowly, and it was not until 
December that the 20 subscribers necessary to officially establish the 
company had enlisted. Nonetheless, this was deemed sufficient to warrant 
the purchase of the barque Tory for £5,250.19 With this purchase, the 
British colonisation of Aotearoa was formalised and set in motion. 
On 20 March 1839, at a gathering of members of the New Zealand 
Company, Edward Gibbon Wakefield proposed the immediate dispatch 
of an expedition to Aotearoa. The urgency of the task was motivated 
by a sudden revelation from William Hutt, MP and secretary of the 
New Zealand Company, that the government intended to pass a bill for 
intervention in Aotearoa. The bill contained a provision that would prevent 
all other parties from purchasing land directly from Māori, forcing them to 
go through the government’s own agents. This news appalled those present, 
17 New Zealand Company, Capital, £400,000 in 4000 Shares of £100 Each, 2 May 
1839 (London: John W. Parker, 1839), 1. 
18 Paid-up capital is the amount of money shareholders pay into the company by 
purchasing shares at the initial issuance. It is created when a company sells its shares 
on the primary market directly to investors. It does not include money later advanced 
by investors to purchase shares on the open market. 
19 Burns, Fatal Success.
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whose enterprise rested on their ability to obtain Māori land cheaply for 
resale to British buyers at enhanced prices. Thus, Wakefield famously urged 
those gathered: ‘possess yourselves of the Soil & you are secure – but, if from 
delay you allow others to do it before you – they will succeed & you will fail’.20 
At these inaugural and decisive stages of its endeavour, Claudia Orange 
explains, the New Zealand Company took the position that by ‘pre-
empting’ the government’s arrival to Aotearoa, the latter would be forced ‘to 
accept its land claims as a fait accompli’.21 It therefore hastened to prepare 
its preliminary expedition and, within less than two months, outfitted 
the Tory with bunks and supplies. At the command of Edward’s brother, 
Colonel William Wakefield, the expedition departed London on 12 May 
1839. It proceeded on the assumption that Colonel Wakefield would be 
able to obtain millions of acres of Māori land in exchange for the £5,000 
worth of goods carried aboard the Tory.22 This was the maiden voyage of the 
first organised mission to colonise Aotearoa. It occurred, as an 1844 select 
committee put it, ‘not only with out the sanction, but in direct defiance of 
the authority of the Crown’.23 
‘The New Zealand Land Bubble!’ 
If the joint-stock company provided the organisational apparatus for the 
New Zealand Company’s colonial endeavour, speculation provided its 
motor and mode of implementation. On 1 June 1839, the New Zealand 
Company issued Terms of Purchase for Lands in the Company’s First and 
20 Edward Betts Hopper, diary entry, 20 March 1839 (1799?–1840), MS-1033-
1034, Alexander Turnbull Library, 18.
21 Claudia Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 
2015), 36.
22 Burns, Fatal Success.
23 Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand: Together with the Minutes of 
Evidence, Appendix, and Index, House of Commons Papers vol. 13, no. 556 (London: 
House of Commons, 1844), iv. 
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Principal Settlement.24 These advertised for sale 99,990 acres of land in 
Aotearoa, at the price of £1 per acre.25 The acres were allotted into 990 
sections ‘each section comprising one town-acre and 100 country-acres’.26 
At the time of publishing the Terms of Purchase, the New Zealand Company 
was yet to obtain a single acre of land in Aotearoa; the Tory did not reach 
the country until August. What the company advertised for sale was not, 
strictly speaking, land. Nor was it even land title, for land title is an asset 
which designates, and whose value is at least tenuously linked to, a particular 
section of land. Rather, it sold what it called ‘land orders’, claims to land in 
the abstract to be actioned at some future date once definite areas of land 
were secured by Colonel Wakefield.
The highly speculative nature of the New Zealand Company’s land 
orders reflected and supported the ‘system’ of colonisation espoused by 
Edward Gibbon Wakefield in his influential 1829 text, A Letter from Sydney, 
the Principal Town of Australia: Together with the Outline of a System of 
Colonization.27 Wakefield believed that the costs of expanding the empire 
should not fall on the English taxpayer, nor on prospective colonists. Rather, 
colonial emigration should ‘be carried on by private speculation, not to 
the loss but to the advantage of those who should defray its expense’.28 In 
practice, this meant that the proceeds from land sales would be used to 
create an ‘emigration fund’ to defray the travel costs of those seeking to 
relocate to the colony.
In accordance with this system, the company promised that capitalists 
who purchased land in Aotearoa could claim a 75 percent rebate to 
24 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase for Lands in the Company’s First and 
Principal Settlement, 1 June 1839 (London: John W. Parker, 1839).
25 This amounts to £101 per acre in today’s terms, according to the Bank of 
England’s inflation calculator, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetary-
policy/inflation/inflation-calculator 
26 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 1.
27 Edward Gibbon Wakefield, A Letter from Sydney, the Principal Town of Australia: 
Together with the Outline of a System of Colonization, ed. Robert Gouger (London: 
Joseph Cross, 1829). 
28 Wakefield, A Letter from Sydney, vii-viii. 
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help finance ‘their own passage and that of their families and servants’.29 
Eligibility was restricted to ‘actual Colonists’—those intending to emigrate 
to the colony and advance capital in its development, as opposed to land 
speculators resident in Britain.30 The remainder of the emigration fund would 
be laid out ‘in providing a free passage for young persons of the labouring 
class’.31 In selecting labourers for emigration, the company promised to ‘give 
preference to applicants under engagement to work for capitalists intending 
to emigrate’.32 Such precautions were supposed to ensure the establishment 
of stable capitalist relations in the colony. Wakefield championed the ‘self-
regulating action’ of a system wherein the supply of labour to the colony was 
indexed to the sale of land, with each section sold providing money for the 
emigration fund.33 
These provisions, however, meant that enticing financial speculation 
was pivotal to the company’s colonial project. As Patricia Burns explains, 
capitalists who bought just one land order and claimed the 75 percent rebate 
‘were a considerable charge on the company’.34 The entirety of the purchase 
money advanced by land speculators resident in Britain, on the other hand, 
could be put towards the emigration fund. Speculation in Māori lands 
would provide the primary means of funding the colonisation of Aotearoa. 
As such, it was actively encouraged by the company, which promised that 
its first settlement would be ‘the commercial Capital of New-Zealand, and, 
therefore, the situation where Land will soonest acquire the highest value by 
means of colonization’.35 
Absentee buyers were lured by the prospect of colonial lands appreciating 
massively in value as capital and labour were poured into agricultural and 
29 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 2.
30 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 2.
31 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 3.
32 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 3.
33 Edward Gibbon Wakefield, England and America: A Comparison of the Social and 
Political State of Both Nations (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1834), 297.
34 Burns, Fatal Success, 102. 
35 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 1. 
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infrastructural development. Such buyers intended to profit on the basis of 
the productive efforts of ‘actual Colonists’; they could safely assume that, 
irrespective of any alterations to their own sections, these would multiply 
in value as surrounding sections were transformed into British-style farms. 
Indeed, it was thought that the mere presence of British subjects in New 
Zealand would immediately raise the value of land that was, in Māori 
hands, ‘worth nothing’.36 By the end of July, all available sections were sold 
and the ‘land orders’ were at a premium, prompting the company to issue a 
further 50,000 acres for sale.37 As Ben Schrader comments: 
Investors were evidently more than willing to gamble on plots of land that 
were both unseen and unbought on the basis of potential huge returns from 
an imaginary city that had still to be built. Conversely, the Company came 
away with a very tangible £100,000 return.38 
Despite the highly speculative nature of the scheme, the New Zealand 
Company declined to guarantee buyers any form of insurance on their 
investments. The Terms of Purchase stated that, ‘The land-orders are to be 
received as sufficient conveyances, and conclusive evidence of the Company’s 
title’.39 Further, ‘the Company are not to be considered as guaranteeing the 
title, except as against their own acts’.40 A Times article of July 1840, titled 
‘the New Zealand Land Bubble!’, condemned this as ‘a system of monstrous 
plunder’.41 The article captured the inherent volatility of the scheme, 
exclaiming that: 
The company will sell and give title to land; but, as they themselves have no 
36 New Zealand Company, Instructions from the New Zealand Land Company to 
Colonel Wakefield, Principle Agent of the Company (London: John W. Parker, 1839), 8.
37 The Spectator, 3 August 1839, 727.
38 Ben Schrader, The Big Smoke: New Zealand Cities, 1840–1920 (Wellington: 
Bridget Williams Books, 2016), 36.
39 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 3.
40 New Zealand Company, Terms of Purchase, 3.
41 The Times, 27 July 1840, 4.
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indefeasible right to the said land, they decline giving any warranty that the buyer 
shall not be ousted from his doubtful purchase; in short, they guarantee nothing 
but their own monstrous assurance, and the consummate folly of their victims.42
To purchase land in a country 25,000 kilometres away, land inhabited by 
another people whose ‘sovereignty’ was affirmed by the British Colonial 
Office at the time,43 and which had not been set foot on by those offering 
it up for sale, would have appeared an excessively risky investment if it were 
not for the racist and colonialist cultural logics that had marked European 
consciousness for centuries. Central here is the assumption that, because 
Indigenous peoples’ lands were not privatised and developed according to 
the capitalist mode of production, they were terra nullius: ‘land belonging 
to no-one’.44 The supposed absence of Indigenous peoples’ land rights—an 
absence actually constructed through a determined denial of Indigenous 
systems of land tenure—was used to legitimise Europeans in occupying, 
privatising, and controlling their lands and resources. 
In lieu of any financial or material security, what backed the contracts 
between the New Zealand Company and its buyers was a shared 
presupposition of entitlement to Māori land underpinned by this pivotal 
colonialist logic of terra nullius (and, more generally, by white supremacy). 
The assumption that the lands and resources of Indigenous peoples could 
be rightfully and spontaneously appropriated by Europeans lent legitimacy 
to the otherwise flimsy contracts made between those transacting in Māori 
land. The surety of the logic of terra nullius, and its entrenched status in the 
minds of Europeans, was such that it rendered further security measures 
unnecessary. Terra nullius provided the company’s buyers with a firmer 
guarantee of their right to the soil than any formal insurance policy could 
have done. 
The New Zealand Company’s land orders were thus informed equally 
by financial and colonialist logics whose convergence engendered quite 
42 The Times, 27 July 1840, 4.
43 See Normanby to Hobson, 730.
44 The Australian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed., ed. Bruce Moore (Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 1332.
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specific forms of material violence. As I have stressed, when the land orders 
were issued for sale in June 1839, the precise geographical area to which 
any one of them referred was yet to be determined. Like stocks, bonds, 
and other financial assets, the orders abstracted from and obfuscated the 
materiality and particularity of the actual ‘assets’ (the lands of hapū and iwi) 
to which they referred. It is in this abstractive function that a specific logical 
affinity between speculative finance and colonialism consists. Colonialism 
necessarily relies on a movement of abstraction which anonymises in order 
to dehumanise Indigenous peoples. It is through a sweeping erasure of the 
materiality and particularity of Indigenous worlds that colonialism reduces 
Indigenous peoples, their lands, and their resources to abstract, readily 
appropriable units of value. In the case of the New Zealand Company, 
speculative finance both facilitated and augmented the abstractive logic of 
colonialism which informed its project. 
As financial assets, the company’s land orders did not possess value in 
themselves.45 Rather, they were claims to value to be actioned at a future 
date, once ‘real’ capital had been invested in the colony and the values 
of the sections had, consequently, appreciated. The financial logic of the 
‘value claim’—essentially an anticipative license to reap unrealised value—
was, in the case of the New Zealand Company’s land orders, racialised and 
rendered violent by virtue of its intersection with coloniality. Undergirded 
by the logic of terra nullius, the apparently abstract financial assets which 
were the company’s land orders necessarily implied material violence; they 
presupposed the dispossession of the original occupants of the lands to which 
they referred. The anticipated values represented by the land orders would 
only be realised progressively with the movements of colonial invasion, 
dispossession, and displacement of Māori and their lands. 
When Colonel Wakefield arrived in Raukawa Moana on 16 August 1839, 
the company was under obligation to fill land orders amounting to 110,000 
acres of Māori land. The colonel’s task was essentially to substantialise the 
45 In Marx, value derives (only) from labour. To the extent that stocks, bonds, and 
other financial assets do not extract value from labour directly, but only via the ‘real’ 
capital invested in production, they are not ‘genuine capital, they do not constitute any 
component of capital and are also in themselves not values’. See Capital vol. III, 590. 
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value claims held by British speculators and prospective colonists. He had 
to anchor financial assets circulating at the (nominal) value of £99,999 to 
determinate plots of land suitable for colonial occupation. And he had to 
do it quickly, with the company’s first fleet of emigrant ships due to arrive 
in Aotearoa from January 1840.  
Within a week of landing at Te Whanganui-a-Tara on 19 September 
1839, Colonel Wakefield laid claim to the entire harbour and surrounding 
ranges of ‘Port Nicholson’. In exchange, he gave local hapū an array of goods 
including guns and ammunition, clothing, cooking utensils, blankets, and 
soap. He then travelled to Kāpiti Island and procured title to an area so 
vast that it was expressed in degrees of latitude.46 He continued to collect 
signatures on parchments and by early November 1839 laid claim to a total 
of 20 million acres, in exchange for which he gave goods to the approximate 
value of £400.47
The nation founded on a bail-out 
By 1843, the New Zealand Company had three settlements which it called 
Wellington, Nelson, and New Plymouth, together home to approximately 
10,000 British emigrants.48 The directors lauded the company’s success in 
their seventh annual report to the shareholders, dated 30 May 1843.49 With 
a nod to the joint-stock system that made their endeavour possible, the 
directors proclaimed that the formation of ‘three new societies’ on a capital 
of £200,000 was ‘a remarkable instance of what may be accomplished in 
46 Hilary Mitchell and John Mitchell, ‘Colonisation: The New Zealand Land 
Company, 1839,’ in Te Tau Ihu o Te Waka: A History of Māori of Nelson and 
Marlborough, Volume I: Te Tangata me Te Whenua: The People and the Land (Wellington: 
Huia, 2005), 252–286.
47 Muriel F. Lloyd Prichard, An Economic History of New Zealand to 1939 (Auckland: 
Collins, 1970), 26. 
48 New Zealand Company, The Seventh Report of the Directors of the New Zealand 
Company Presented to The Annual Court of Proprietors, 31 May 1843 (London: Johnston 
and Barrett, 1843).
49 Prichard, An Economic History.
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overcoming formidable difficulties, by the power of association, exercised 
in such a manner as to secure the public confidence’.50 The report did 
not, however, relay details of the true state of the company’s finances. The 
company was insolvent, having ‘incurred obligations constituting a Debt 
which it has no present means of fulfilling’.51 The cash deficit was £30,645 
and a large part of the capital was invested and ‘not immediately available’.52 
Adding debts, the cash assets were £30,632.53
At root, the cause of the company’s financial difficulties was a 
contradiction between its speculative financial basis and the establishment 
of capitalist relations in the colony. According to W J Gardner, ‘The 
Company’s announced economic objective was to establish “concentrated” 
agricultural settlements, on the model of the best English corn counties’.54 
However, the professed aims of the New Zealand Company came into 
conflict with their means of realisation. The company’s efforts to encourage 
speculation in Māori lands were so successful that in the Hutt settlement 
in Te Whanganui-a-Tara an overwhelming four-fifths of the landowners 
were absentees.55 Similarly, just one quarter of the initial purchasers of 
Nelson land actually emigrated to the settlement.56 This predominance of 
absentee buyers relative to ‘emigrants of capital’ undermined the settlement 
economies and contributed to the forces impelling the company towards its 
eventual collapse in 1850.
Firstly, it meant that hundreds of absentee-owned sections, left 
undeveloped and uninhabited, lay interspersed among the colonists’ 
50 Prichard, An Economic History, 3.
51 Report of the Special Committee, 22 May 1843, in Colonial Office: New Zealand 
Company Records (CO 208/186), 311–326. Micro-MS-Coll-13-1443, Alexander 
Turnbull Library.
52 Report of the Special Committee, 22 May 1843.
53 Report of the Special Committee, 22 May 1843.
54 W. J. Gardner, ‘A Colonial Economy,’ in The Oxford History of New Zealand, 2nd 
ed., ed. Geoffrey Rice (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 60. 
55 William Swainson, Letter to the Editor, The New Zealand Gazette, 17 August 
1842, 2.
56 Burns, Fatal Success.
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sections. This prevented the construction of basic infrastructure such as 
roads, drains, and fences, which in turn hampered the development of 
agriculture. Colonists argued that it was ‘impossible’ for them to pay, on top 
of their own development costs, ‘that of twice or thrice as many absentees 
also’.57 ‘Absenteeism’ was a source of great frustration among the colonists, 
one of whom wrote in 1842 that it ‘cripples all our exertions and bids fair to 
crush all agricultural undertakings by the renters’.58 This extent to which the 
predominance of speculative capital retarded the productive efforts of the 
colonists is reflected in that, by September 1843, the Wellington settlement 
had just 380 acres of arable land.59 The inability of colonists to establish 
farms and commerce reduced the allure of the company’s land orders for 
both absentees and capitalist emigrants.
Another issue that arose from the New Zealand Company’s reliance 
on speculative capital was that its settlements were seriously lacking in 
employment opportunities for the thousands of workers who emigrated 
on the promise of a better life. Not only had relatively few landowners 
emigrated to Aotearoa, but, of those who did, few were large-scale employers. 
As Burns explains, ‘they had come to New Zealand to make their fortune, 
while the wealthy had stayed home and taken out a small speculation in 
company land’.60 From 1842, unemployment and resulting conditions of 
hardship were widespread in the company’s settlements.61 The company’s 
own colonists drew a direct link between their situation and what they 
identified as an ‘excess of labour in relation to the amount of private capital 
available for its agricultural or otherwise productive employment’.62 This 
imbalance, they argued, stemmed from the treatment of land as a speculative 
commodity. Accordingly, they proposed solutions such as ‘making the price 
57 Swainson, Letter to the Editor, 2.
58 Swainson, Letter to the Editor, 2.
59 Burns, Fatal Success.
60 Burns, Fatal Success, 163.
61 Burns, Fatal Success. These conditions are well-documented in colonial newspapers 
of 1842–1844.
62 The Nelson Examiner, 12 November 1842, 142.
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of land too high to make it a profitable investment to purchase largely as a 
speculation without intention to cultivate’.63 
Unemployment was a major problem for the New Zealand Company, 
not least because of its potential to erupt in working class uprisings that 
threatened the very existence of its settlements, as it did in Nelson in 1843.64 
Beyond this, unemployment caused a direct financial drain on the company 
owing to a clause in its Regulations for Labourers Wishing to Emigrate to New 
Zealand, published in June 1839. These promised that any labourers unable 
to find work with colonial capitalists would be employed ‘in the service of 
the Company’.65 In Nelson alone there were 300 workers employed by the 
company in 1843, constituting an expense of £1,500 per month.66 In efforts 
to cut costs, the company suspended emigration, cut salaries, and laid off 
hundreds of labourers ‘who, with their wives and families, were entirely 
dependent upon it for subsistence’.67 
Both the frustrated agricultural development of the settlements and 
the unemployment that prevailed in them were symptoms of an economy 
premised upon and driven by speculative, as opposed to productive, 
capitalist interests. Perhaps the company should have heeded its colonists 
who recognised that, while the colony ‘owed a debt’ to the absentees, 
their utility was finite.68 Instead, between 1841 and 1843, the company 
continued founding new settlements in the hopes of generating fresh waves 
63 The Nelson Examiner, 24 December 1842, 166.
64 See J. S. Marais, The Colonisation of New Zealand (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 
1968), 138–140.
65 New Zealand Company, Regulations for Labourers Wishing to Emigrate to 
New Zealand, 29 June 1839, in Colonial Office: New Zealand Company Records (CO 
208/291). Micro-MS-Coll-13, Alexander Turnbull Library.
66 Marais, The Colonisation of New Zealand. 
67 ‘Report of the Committee on the New Zealand Company’s Debt,’ in Votes 
and Proceedings of the House of Representatives, 1854 Session I–II (Auckland: William 
and Wilson for the New Zealand Government, 1854), 4, available at https://
paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/parliamentary/votes-and-proceedings-of-the-house-of-
representatives/1854/I-II 
68 New Zealand Colonist, 23 September 1842, 2.
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of speculative capital.69 At this time, parliamentary avenues of support were 
not viable; the British government had ‘never recognized the New Zealand 
Land Company as a legally constituted body, nor acknowledged the validity 
of [its] titles’.70 The company occupied a paradoxical position definitive of 
financial bubbles in general, wherein the only thing keeping its venture 
afloat, reckless speculation in Māori land, was simultaneously driving it 
towards collapse. 
The company ‘founded’ the settlements of ‘Nelson’ in early 1841 and 
‘New Edinburgh’ in July 1843. Each time, it offered up for sale hundreds 
of thousands of acres of Māori land to which it had no rights. Ultimately, 
the outcome of this strategy was that the company’s land claims were 
widely contested throughout the 1840s, with colonists unable to take up 
occupation of their sections.71 Under immense pressure to fill orders before 
settlers arrived, and largely ignorant of Māori land tenure, the company’s 
agents failed to make purchases ‘that would stand up in any court’.72 In 
1841, Chief Protector of Aborigines George Clarke found that from Waitara 
to Whanganui, Kāpiti, and Porirua, Māori everywhere ‘declared they had 
never sold their pas and cultivations’.73 
This was corroborated in 1842–1844, when the British government 
appointed a land claims commissioner, William Spain, to inquire into 
69 Land orders were issued for sale in ‘Nelson’ in early 1841 and ‘New Edinburgh’ in 
July 1843.
70 ‘Report of Mr. Commissioner Spain’, 12 September 1843 (Appendix no. 9), in 
Report from the Select Committee on New Zealand: Together with the Minutes of Evidence, 
Appendix, and Index, House of Commons Papers vol. 13, no. 556 (London: House of 
Commons, 1844), 293.
71 Some colonists wrote to the Company demanding compensation. See, for 
instance, New Zealand Company, Mr W. A. Wansey to Colonel Wakefield, 20 April 
1842 (Appendix H. no. 5), in Contents of the Appendices to the Twelfth Report of the 
Directors of the New Zealand Company (London: Palmer and Clayton, 1844), 960.  
72 Burns, Fatal Success, 212. 
73 George Clarke, ‘The Chief Protector’s Report of a Visit to Port Nicholson,’ 
enclosed in a letter from Governor Hobson to the Principal Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 13 November 1841, in Papers and Despatches Relative to New Zealand; Return 
of Land in Colony Sold by Government, House of Commons Papers, vol. 28 no. 569 
(London: House of Commons, 1842), 172. 
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land purchases made by the company prior to 1840. Spain found that the 
immense ‘Port Nicholson’ claim and almost all of the company’s other claims 
were invalid. He observed that ‘all the Company’s purchases were made in a 
very loose and careless manner’.74 The company described immense parcels 
of land on the deeds, totalling one-third of the surface area of Aotearoa, 
and ‘afterwards selected the most available districts within their imaginary 
boundaries’.75 Colonel William Wakefield did not bother to ascertain 
‘whether the thousands of aboriginal inhabitants occupying the surface of 
these vast tracts of country had been consenting parties to the sale’.76 
Evidence taken before Spain’s court shows that the New Zealand 
Company’s interpreter, Richard Barrett, did not understand the vague, 
pseudo-legalistic terms of the ‘Port Nicholson’ deed himself, let alone render 
it interpretable to Māori.77 What more critically invalidated this and other 
‘sales’, though, was the fact that those who signed the deeds often had no 
authority to alienate lands on behalf of their iwi. The people of Te Aro, for 
instance, firmly denied the authority of Te Ātiawa chiefs Te Puni and Te 
Wharepouri to ‘sell’ the vast surrounds of the Port Nicholson harbour.78 For 
them to do so was not possible within the framework of tikanga Māori, which 
predominated in Aotearoa at this time, according to which the concept of 
exclusive ownership vested in the individual did not exist.79 
The illegitimacy of the company’s land claims was not so much 
74 ‘Report of Mr. Commissioner Spain,’ 305.
75 ‘Report of Mr. Commissioner Spain,’ 301.
76 ‘Report of Mr. Commissioner Spain,’ 305.
77 For the English version of the Port Nicholson deed as well as Barrett’s translation 
(as recalled as evidence for Commissioner Spain) see Appendix no. 3 in Rosemarie V. 
Tonk, The First New Zealand Land Commissions, 1840–1845 (MA thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 1986), 334–337. Also see Waitangi Tribunal, ‘The New Zealand Company 
Deed of Purchase,’ in Te Whanganui a Tara me ona Takiwa: Report on the Wellington 
District, WAI 145 (Wellington: Legislation Direct, 2003), 45–69. 
78 Burns, Fatal Success. 
79 Waitangi Tribunal, ‘The New Zealand Company Deed of Purchase,’ 45–69. On 
tikanga Māori prior to 1840 see Ani Mikaere, Colonising Myths – Māori Realities: He 
Rukuruku Whakaaro (Wellington: Huia, 2011). 
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unknown to Colonel Wakefield as it was deemed immaterial to his project.80 
He was determined to force the claims into being by any means necessary. 
This would not, however, be met without resistance. In Te Whanganui-a-
Tara, the people of Te Aro, Pipitea, Kumutoto, and Tiakiwai obstructed 
company surveyors by pulling up survey pegs and eradicating markings.81 
The surveyors were only able to complete their work by force of arms.82 
Colonel Wakefield’s approach fatally backfired in June 1843, when Nelson 
colonists attempted to force the survey of lands in the Wairau Valley.83 Ngāti 
Toa, who had ahi kā and take raupatu rights in the area, had not alienated 
the land and sent clear warnings against its colonial occupation. The 
confrontation resulted in the deaths of 22 of the company’s colonists and 
four Ngāti Toa warriors.84 The events at Wairau shocked Colonel Wakefield 
into realising that the immense claims he had accumulated in a speculative-
colonial frenzy would not hold, unless he acted quickly to secure them.85 
The collapse of the ‘New Zealand Land Bubble’ and with it, the New 
Zealand Company, was driven by a series of compounding factors with 
a common root: the speculative, profiteering logic that dominated the 
company’s project. Either in ignorance or refusal of this, the company 
attributed its decline to the failure of successive governments to recognise 
and secure its land claims. In February 1844, the New Zealand Company 
made a plea to the British government for ‘immediate pecuniary assistance 
in order to preserve from ruin the Capitalists in the Colony, and from 
starvation the Emigrant Labourers, till such time as the restoration of 
80 Wakefield was informed on multiple occassions that the land ‘sales’ were disputed 
by Māori. See Burns, Fatal Success, 119–120.
81 Rosemarie Tonk, ‘“A Difficult and Complicated Question”: The New Zealand 
Company’s Wellington, Port Nicholson, Claim,’ in The Making of Wellington, 1800–
1914, ed. David Allan Hamer and Roberta Nicholls (Wellington: Victoria University 
Press, 1990), 36–37.
82 Tonk, ‘“A Difficult and Complicated Question.”’
83 See Lowther Broad, The Jubilee History of Nelson: From 1842 to 1892 (Nelson: 
Bond, Finney and Co., 1892), 48–52.
84 Burns, Fatal Success.
85 See Tonk, ‘New Zealand Land Commissions,’ 215–221. 
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Public Confidence shall have produced its anticipated effect’.86 The request 
was declined due to the extent of the company’s debts. The then colonial 
secretary, Lord Stanley, had little sympathy for the company, arguing that 
its scheme ‘has been from the first a great bubble, the bursting of which but 
for the immediate consequences to their Settlers I should rejoice at, and 
consider eminently advantageous to New Zealand’.87
In June 1846, a change in government meant that the company’s 
prospects for the future became more optimistic. Earl Grey, who was highly 
sympathetic towards the company’s endeavour, was appointed colonial 
secretary in the new government of Lord John Russell. Grey’s new under-
secretary, Benjamin Hawes, was one of the company’s directors. Grey 
proposed an ‘experiment’ wherein the company would, for three years, 
have ‘the entire and exclusive disposal of all Crown lands’ in Aotearoa.88 
It would also have the sole right of pre-emption over ‘lands belonging to 
the natives in the southern Government’ of the country.89 Grey advanced 
the sum of £236,000 ‘for the purpose of enabling the company to meet its 
present liabilities and the outlay necessary for the vigorous prosecution of 
its operations’.90
The agreement stated that if, after three years, the company had 
regained a position of financial self-sufficiency, it would be required to repay 
the principal. If, on the other hand, the company was unable to continue 
operations without further assistance, the Crown would assume ownership 
of all the company’s land claims and other assets. For this, the Crown would 
pay out the company at the rate of five shillings per acre, the value to be fixed 
86 New Zealand Company, Minutes of the Court of Directors, 17 February 
1844, in Colonial Office: New Zealand Company Records (CO 208/182), Micro-MS-
Coll-13-1443, Alexander Turnbull Library.
87 Burns, Fatal Success, citing Lord Stanley, 257.
88 ‘Mr. Hawes to the Secretary of the Company, 10 May 1847,’ New Zealand 
Spectator, 20 October 1847, 3–4.
89 ‘Mr. Hawes to the Secretary,’ 4. The ‘Southern Government’, distinct from 
Hobson’s Government at Auckland, included the whole of the South Island, Stewart 
Island, as well as the Southern part of the North Island.
90 ‘Mr. Hawes to the Secretary,’ 4.
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at £268,000.91 It was later found that the company was able to obtain such a 
favourable arrangement only ‘by carefully concealing from his Lordship the 
amount of its liabilities’.92 Further, Grey was unaware of the spuriousness of 
the company’s land claims, believing that it ‘had completely and equitably 
extinguished the native title’.93
The company failed to recover itself within the agreed-upon period and, 
on 2 July 1850, the directors unanimously resolved to cease operations.94 
Land sales had dwindled, generating just £6,266 in revenue for the year 
ended April 1849.95 A later inquiry into the company’s finances revealed 
that the funds advanced to them in 1847 were misappropriated. Rather than 
investing the money productively by, for instance, creating employment 
in the settlements, the directors lent a substantial amount to their own 
shareholders (which was lost), and also pocketed for themselves ‘sums of 
considerable magnitude’.96 
In accordance with Earl Grey’s 1847 agreement, the Crown bought out 
the New Zealand Company and assumed ownership of its land claims, which 
were assessed at 1,092,000 acres.97 It was agreed that the £268,000 owing to 
the company be reduced to £200,000, the paid-up capital of the company.98 
In 1852, the New Zealand Constitution Act granted self-government to the 
colony of ‘New Zealand’ and thus formalised its status as an independent 
nation. The first general assembly of parliament, which opened on 24 May 
1854, resolved to settle the £200,000 owing to the New Zealand Company 
with a loan guaranteed by the British government.99 
91 J. P. Cumming, The Compact and Financial Settlement of 1856 (MA thesis, 
University of Auckland, 1963).
92 ‘Report of the Committee on the New Zealand Company’s Debt,’ 8.
93 Cumming, Financial Settlement, 14.
94 ‘The Dissolution of the New Zealand Company,’ The Nelson Examiner, 9 
November 1850, 147.
95 Burns, Fatal Success.
96 ‘Report of the Committee on the New Zealand Company’s Debt,’ 9.
97 Marais, The Colonisation of New Zealand.
98 Burns, Fatal Success.
99 Marais, The Colonisation of New Zealand.
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The New Zealand Loan Act 1856 provided for a £500,000 loan to be 
raised in Britain ‘by bonds debentures or otherwise’, for the purpose of 
liquidating the charge to the New Zealand Company and meeting other 
liabilities of the colony.100 The principal and interest would be ‘a first charge 
upon the general revenue of the Colony of New Zealand’.101 The loan 
received the royal assent in August 1857 and, in May 1858, the directors of 
the New Zealand Company were finally able to ‘congratulate the Shareholders 
on the repayment in full of the Company’s entire paid-up capital’.102
Ultimately, the burden of the company’s debt was shouldered by its 
own colonists. It was imposed as the first charge on the land revenue, the 
fund accrued by the colonial administration through the appropriation and 
sale of Māori land. Each time a colonist purchased land, one-quarter of 
the purchase money went towards servicing the colony’s debt to the New 
Zealand Company.103 To the company, this system was perfectly justified; as 
an 1854 parliamentary committee explained, ‘the debt fixed on the Colony 
was considered money due for what in commercial language is termed value 
received’.104 
One of the first orders of business for the newly established New 
Zealand parliament was, then, authorising a public bailout of the company 
that independently implemented the colonisation of Aotearoa in 1839. It 
was thus that the founding of the modern nation of ‘New Zealand’ quite 
aptly coincided with the settling of its colonial debts. 
100 New Zealand Government, New Zealand Loan Act, 1856 (New Zealand Legal 
Information Institute [19 and 20 VICT 1856 No 17]), 55, available at http://www.
nzlii.org/nz/legis/hist_act/nzla185619a20v1856n17290/ 
101 New Zealand Government, New Zealand Loan Act, 55. 
102 New Zealand Company, Thirty-Fifth Report of the Court of Directors of the New 
Zealand Company, 27 May 1858 (London, 1858), 1.
103 Cumming, Financial Settlement. 
104 ‘Report of the Committee on the New Zealand Company’s Debt,’ 6.
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Finance colonises
What this paper is able to bring to light by rereading the historical 
record is that the colonisation of Aotearoa was in large part effected 
by finance capital, its institutions, instruments, and practices. From its 
conditions of possibility, mode of implementation, and consolidation, 
finance was indispensable to every stage of the colonial project enacted in 
Aotearoa between 1839 and 1850, and moreover shaped the course of its 
development for decades to come.
The organised settler-colonisation of Aotearoa from 1839 began as the 
illegal project of a British corporate enterprise. Edward Gibbon Wakefield 
and his peers recognised the ‘powers of association’ inherent in the joint-
stock system and exploited these as a way to quickly raise the capital 
necessary to launch their colonial expedition. Speculation was the fulcrum 
of the company’s entire operation; so long as it continued to stoke up ‘the 
New Zealand Land Bubble’, it could continue to export settler-emigrants to 
Aotearoa. The company’s reliance on speculative capital, however, ultimately 
undermined its entire operation. Insolvent in 1843, financial assistance 
from the British government propped up the company until 1850, when it 
finally collapsed and relinquished its assets to the Crown.
In all, the company established settlements in Wellington, Whanganui, 
New Plymouth, Nelson, and, indirectly, in Dunedin and Christchurch, and 
was directly responsible for importing about 15,500 of Aotearoa’s founding 
colonists.105 With the bailout of 1850, the Crown not only inherited 
the assets but also the colonial legacy of the company whose intentions 
to colonise Aotearoa it had adamantly opposed just ten years earlier. The 
Crown had the legal structures and military might to enforce and secure the 
Company’s extensive, widely contested land claims. Moreover, it had the 
resources to elaborate the company’s colonial project on an exponentially 
greater scale. The system of raupatu practiced by the Crown for decades to 
105 Michael King, The Penguin History of New Zealand (Auckland: Penguin Books, 
2003), 173. Edward Gibbon Wakefield was involved in two offshoots of the New 
Zealand Company—the Otago Association and the Canterbury Association, which 
established settlements in Dunedin in 1848 and Christchurch in 1850 respectively. 
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come, wherein Māori lands were appropriated for a few pence per acre and 
resold for upwards of ten times that, was directly influenced by Edward 
Gibbon Wakefield’s theories on colonisation.106
To think colonisation in and through its relation with finance and, 
equally, to think finance in and through its relation with colonisation, 
elicits quite different conclusions from those reached when each is treated 
as a discrete category of analysis. On an epistemological level, the extensive 
and determining role of finance in the colonisation of Aotearoa presents a 
challenge to commonly held understandings of this country’s history. In 
particular, it calls into question the assumption that the locus of colonial 
power is the state. 
Orthodox historical accounts overwhelmingly accord centrality to the 
Crown as the agent impelling the colonisation of Aotearoa. In this, the 
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi is widely regarded as the foundational 
‘moment’ of colonisation. The Treaty, and in particular the pre-emption 
clause that established a Crown monopoly over land purchases, heralded 
decades of colonial occupation and dispossession of Māori lands by the 
state. What is not typically acknowledged, however, is that an association 
of private capitalist interests implemented the organised settler-colonisation 
of Aotearoa against the authority of the British government and prior to its 
formal intervention in the country. 
While the government debated various, more limited, forms of 
intervention in the years preceding the Tory’s departure, it was this event that 
prompted the drastic decision ‘to treat with the aborigines of New Zealand 
for the recognition of Her Majesty’s sovereign authority’.107 As Peter Adams 
writes, ‘the sudden action of the New Zealand Company in despatching 
emigrants for the first systematic colony in mid-1839 forced the Colonial 
Office to accept that perhaps the whole country should be annexed and 
106 Adams, Fatal Necessity. 
107 Normanby to Hobson, 731. In his instructions to Hobson, Lord Normanby 
cites the actions of the Company in purchasing land and conveying colonists to New 
Zealand as justification for the need to elicit a treaty. 
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that the Government itself should undertake colonizing measures’.108 The 
Treaty, then, must be understood, at least in part, as a reactive move. Like 
the bailout of 1850, the Treaty was a state response to, and attempt to rein 
in, a colonial project driven by finance. 
In emphasising the role of finance in the colonisation of Aotearoa, 
however, this paper does not intend to detract from the Crown’s role in that 
colonisation, nor to diminish the violence of the colonial state in any way. 
Rather, it hopes that by decentring the state, by situating state agency in and 
through its relationship with finance, a more comprehensive understanding 
of the colonisation of Aotearoa will be discerned. The intention is to 
elucidate another, lesser-known history that does not invalidate but rather 
supplements, contextualises, and complicates the dominant, state-centred 
history of Aotearoa’s colonisation. 
Beyond its implications for historical knowledge, the counter-history 
that this paper begins to elicit contains important lessons for contemporary 
politics in Aotearoa New Zealand and, in particular, for the thinking of 
counter-futures beyond colonialism and capitalism. The fact that, in 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s history, finance was not incidental to state-
implemented practices of colonisation, but rather conditioned, enabled, 
and at times necessitated these, suggests that the state should not be the 
only, nor perhaps even the primary, site of struggle in decolonial politics 
today. It is not only the state but also finance capital that must be held to 
account for its colonial legacy in this land. 
Since its establishment in 1975, the Waitangi Tribunal has become the 
primary site through which Māori can seek compensation for the extensive 
confiscation and misappropriation of land and resources that colonisation has 
enacted. This system pertains to breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi by the 
Crown, and does not allow for finance, its institutions, and its representatives 
108 Adams, Fatal Necessity, x. 
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to be directly held to account as agents of colonisation.109 This is particularly 
troubling, not only in light of the colonising role of finance historically, but 
in light of the continued centrality of finance in maintaining and extending 
colonial structures in contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand. 
Indeed, financial capital, with its particular metrics and logics, 
significantly constrains the Treaty settlements process itself and the forms 
of redress and recognition it affords to iwi. The financialisation of the 
Treaty settlements’ framework is part of an overwhelming financialisation 
of public services, including welfare, housing, health, law, and education, 
which has occurred with the ascendancy of finance in mature capitalist 
economies from the 1970s.110 Beyond an economic shift wherein profits 
are accrued increasingly through financial channels rather than productive 
ones,111 financialisation has engendered what Max Haiven describes as a 
‘deep penetration of financial ideas, tropes, logics and processes into the 
fabric of everyday life’.112 Increasingly, daily routines of work, domesticity, 
consumption, and study demand an engagement with financial services and 
109 The Waitangi Tribunal does, however, report on financial interests and 
institutions when they are relevant to breaches of the Treaty by the Crown. In this way, 
finance can sometimes be indirectly held to account through the Crown. For instance, 
a recent Waitangi Tribunal inquiry found that the New Zealand Company’s Port 
Nicholson purchase was invalid, and that the Crown failed to protect Māori Treaty 
rights in connection with this. Accordingly, the tribunal recommended substantial 
compensation, including the return of land, to several Te Whanganui-a-Tara iwi by the 
Crown. See Waitangi Tribunal, Te Whanganui a Tara me ona Takiwa, WAI 145, 45–69, 
479–493.
110 Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis; Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing: 
How Finance Exploits Us All (London: Verso, 2013). On the financialisation of the 
New Zealand economy see Jane Kelsey, The FIRE Economy: New Zealand’s Reckoning 
(Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2015). There is also a large literature on the 
social, cultural, and political effects of financialisation. See, for instance, Max Haiven, 
Crises of Imagination, Crises of Power: Capitalism, Creativity and the Commons (London: 
Zed Books, 2014); Randy Martin, Financialization of Daily Life (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2002). 
111 Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis. 
112 Max Haiven, Cultures of Financialization: Fictitious Capital in Popular Culture 
and Everyday Life (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 18. 
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an adoption of financialised sensibilities.113 The financialisation of public 
services and everyday life is not only the result of financialised capital 
ascendant, but serves to reproduce it by inviting a particular kind of subject 
who is amenable to the untrammelled flows of financial capital. 
In the case of Aotearoa New Zealand’s Treaty settlements system, 
financialisation is seen in the way that iwi are required to restructure 
along corporate lines in order to access settlement resources.114 It is seen 
in the way that mechanisms such as annual ‘Iwi Investment Reports’ then 
measure iwi success in terms of risk-management, diversification of assets, 
and profitability.115 It is further seen in arrangements such as the ‘Sealord 
deal’ of 1992, which converted Māori customary fishing rights into quota, 
transferable financial assets that entitle their holders to make a claim on 
the resources of Tangaroa. Lacking the capital to make use of their quota, 
iwi often lease them to large corporations, in the process transforming 
hapū into minor shareholders with respect to their own ancestral rights.116 
Financialisation here dovetails with assimilationist coloniality to deprive 
whānau of continuing ancestral fishing practices and to extend a logic of 
division and privatisation over Tangaroa. 
The financialisation of Treaty settlements, of course, is not simply 
an inevitable outcome of the broader encroachment of financial metrics 
into every aspect of social life; it is also a highly effective means by which 
113 On the ‘financialisation of the senses’ that has accompanied the economic 
ascendancy of finance in recent decades see Campbell Jones, ‘Finance, University, 
Revolt,’ Argos Aotearoa 1 (2014): 46; ‘The Embers of Truth in the Ashes of Finance,’ in 
The Global Financial Crisis and Educational Restructuring, ed. Michael A. Peters, Joao 
M. Paraskeva, and Tina Besley (New York: Peter Lang, 2014), 123.
114 On the effects of corporatisation in creating distinct economic divisions among 
Māori see E S.Te Ahu Poata-Smith, ‘The Changing Contours of Maori Identity and 
the Treaty Settlement Process,’ in Waitangi Tribunal: Te Roopu Whakamana i te Tiriti 
o Waitangi, ed. Janine Hayward and Nicola Wheen (Wellington: Bridget Williams 
Books, 2004), 168–183.
115 See TDB Advisory Limited, Iwi Investment Report 2016, 8 December 2016, 
available at http://www.tdb.co.nz/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/TDB-Iwi-Investment-
Report-2016-WEB.pdf   
116 See Fiona McCormack, ‘Fish is My Daily Bread: Owning and Transacting in 
Maori Fisheries,’ Anthropological Forum 20, no.1 (2010): 19–39.
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the Crown maintains control over the terms by which Māori and their 
claims may be recognised and, in turn, maintains its hold on sovereignty. 
Fundamentally, it serves the colonial state by persistently working to reduce 
tino rangatiratanga to (some degree of ) economic self-determination, in an 
attempt to ward off threats of Māori political autonomy. This (re)articulation 
of Māori redress claims in financial terms enables the Crown to protect its 
monopoly hold on sovereignty in this country. In contemporary Aotearoa 
New Zealand, the twin authorities of finance capital and the colonial state 
powerfully shape, co-opt, and delimit the ‘postcolonial’ political landscape 
and the possibilities of moving beyond it. 
The hypocrisy and cynicism of the Crown’s refusal to afford any 
substantive ‘redress’ to Māori is readily grasped when viewed in the context 
of the financial history of colonisation. The Crown repeatedly claims that 
it cannot service the debts it owes to Māori communities for the decades 
of colonial violence it has waged against them. In 2011, for instance, Far 
North iwi Ngāti Kahu assessed the debt owed to it by the Crown at $260 
million in land and other assets.117 The Crown, however, rejected Ngāti 
Kahu’s assessment as ‘wholly unrealistic’ and urged the iwi to accept its 
settlement offer of $23.4 million.118 Similar arguments were expressed in 
2003, when Treaty Negotiations Minister Margaret Wilson stated that ‘New 
Zealand cannot afford to fully compensate each iwi for their historic losses’.119 
Yet, in 1850, the Crown was able and willing to mobilise £200,000—
approximately £730.7 million in today’s terms, measured as a percentage 
of the output of the UK economy—to bail out the company that illegally 
117 ‘Waitangi Tribunal Puts Settlement Cost at $42m,’ New Zealand 
Herald, 4 February 2013, https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_
id=1&objectid=10863319 
118 ‘Far North Iwi Treaty Demands Unrealistic – Crown,’ Radio New Zealand, 20 
September 2012, http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/regional/116264/far-north-iwi-
treaty-demands-unrealistic-crown
119 Margaret Wilson, ‘Ngaa Rauru Kiitahi: Third Taranaki Settlement Signed,’ 28 
November 2003, available at https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/ngaa-rauru-kiitahi-
third-taranaki-settlement-signed
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initiated the settler-colonisation of Aotearoa.120 When the New Zealand 
Company’s colonial project eventually collapsed, the Crown responded by 
assuming ownership of the company’s land claims, burdening taxpayers 
with the cost of this immense transfer of wealth. If, instead, the Crown 
had returned the company’s assets to their rightful ‘owners’, the Indigenous 
peoples of Aotearoa, it would not now be in the position of owing such 
substantial and, in many ways, unpayable debts to iwi and hapū today.121 
The intricate ways in which financial-capitalist and colonial-state power 
intersect to negate and undermine the exercise of tino rangatiratanga are a 
key aspect of the struggle confronting decolonisation efforts in Aotearoa 
New Zealand today. They provoke the question of how decolonisation 
might be effected outside of state-sanctioned, financialised avenues such 
as the Treaty-settlements framework. The bringing to light of historical 
and material intertwinements of finance and colonisation offers a starting 
point.  What it suggests is that struggles to overcome finance capital and 
colonisation must be likewise intertwined. 
Considering the historical and ongoing centrality of finance to the 
colonisation of Aotearoa, contemporary efforts to dismantle or move beyond 
colonialism will likely be found lacking if they do not simultaneously 
advance a critique of finance capital. Financial institutions, instruments, and 
practices must be held to account for their active role in the appropriation 
of Māori land, labour, and resources, and in the imposition of colonial-
capitalist ideologies on Māori subjects. I will not here attempt to elaborate 
a broader argument for the necessity of an anti-capitalist approach to 
120 This figure was reached using the economic cost measure on the online 
MeasuringWorth calculator. This measure is appropriate for assessing the relative worth 
of a project—for instance, an investment or government expenditure. It was chosen 
because it helps to indicate the importance of the expenditure to society as a whole. 
This and alternative measures are available here: ‘Five Ways to Compute the Relative 
Value of a UK Pound Amount, 1270 to Present,’ MeasuringWorth, https://www.
measuringworth.com/calculators/ukcompare/
121 As Max Haiven points out, ‘The compound debt owed to Indigenous 
people is, essentially, immeasurable’. See Haiven, ‘The Uses of Financial Literacy: 
Financialization, the Radical Imagination, and the Unpayable Debts of Settler 
Colonialism,’ Cultural Politics 13, no.3 (2017): 363.  
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decolonisation; rather, I simply wish to state that, insofar as finance was and 
remains an integral driver of coloniality, it presents itself as a key target for 
decolonial struggles in contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand. To destabilise 
the financial institutions, instruments, and practices that so often support, 
if not drive, colonial practices is to fundamentally destabilise the material 
reproduction of coloniality as such.
To hold finance to account for its role in colonising Aotearoa involves 
an unravelling of its apparent neutrality. Finance is masterfully presented 
as ‘pure technique’ to the extent that it is widely ascribed the status of an 
apolitical or even ‘post-political’ sphere of activity.122 The stripping out of 
politics from financial practices such as rent, interest, taxation, and debt is, 
of course, a reactive strategy of a capitalist economics which, as Campbell 
Jones maintains, ‘neutralises or seeks to defuse the explosive social and 
political potential that is contained in such practices’.123 The capacity of 
finance to masquerade as an opaque realm of specialised activity, bracketed 
off from the everyday lives of workers and households, serves to insulate it 
from scrutiny and critique. This apparent immunity of finance from politics, 
together with its apparent abstraction from ‘real-world’ affairs, undoubtedly 
contributes to the omission or side-lining of finance in orthodox histories 
of the colonisation of Aotearoa. The claim that finance colonises advanced 
here forces finance from the domain of economists and into the domain of 
politics. 
Conclusion
The knowledge that, in past and present Aotearoa New Zealand, finance 
capital and colonisation significantly intersect and impel one another’s 
reproduction, proves informative not only for decolonial politics but 
also for contemporary anti-capitalist politics. The colonisation of Māori 
lands, resources, and value systems was and remains a central means to the 
122 Campbell Jones, ‘The Embers of Truth,’ 135.
123 Campbell Jones, ‘Rent, Interest, Profit,’ Counterfutures 6 (2018): 72.
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expansion and reproduction of financial capital in Aotearoa New Zealand. 
This is seen in the case of the New Zealand Company, where what began 
as a colonial operation dependent on finance soon became a financial-
speculative operation dependent on perpetual colonisation. 
Today, the accumulation of finance capital demands the ongoing 
colonisation of ‘new’ sources of value extraction and speculation which, in 
Aotearoa New Zealand, are often sought in Māori lands and resources. Such 
mutually supportive relationships between finance capital and colonisation 
suggest that it is strategic (if not essential) for anti-capitalist movements 
to confront coloniality as a key site of struggle. To contest the regime of 
financialised capital that has come to predominate in Aotearoa New Zealand 
without contesting the structures of coloniality on which it rests and thrives 
is insufficient, to say the least. 
The counter-history that this paper weaves both performs and provokes 
shifts in the thinking of Aotearoa New Zealand’s history and, in particular, 
of the relation between finance and colonisation. This history also elicits 
the concrete political implication that the contestation of one is incomplete 
without the contestation of the other. This should not be taken to suggest 
that decolonial and anti-capitalist struggles in Aotearoa New Zealand are 
the same struggle, but rather that the entangled histories of finance and 
colonisation render them (already) necessarily aligned. It will, however, 
take recognition and assertion of this alignment by those engaged in these 
respective struggles to mount an effective challenge to finance capitalism 
and colonialism today. 
